State v. Owens Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 41174 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-15-2014
State v. Owens Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41174
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Owens Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41174" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4933.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4933
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DAMENIEL OWENS, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
NO. 41174 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. 
CR 2012-9460 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLERANDYJ.STOKER 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7353 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 4 
The District Court Erred When it Denied Mr. Owens' Motion for Credit 
Time Served ................................................................................... 4 
A Introduction ................................................................................... 4 
B. Standard Of Review .............................................................................. 4 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Owens' Request For 
Credit For Time Served ........................................................................ .4 
1. I.C. § 19-309 Is Not Ambiguous ....................................................... 7 
2. Hoch Was Incorrectly Decided As The Statue Is Not Ambiguous .... ? 
3. Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The 
Statute, Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted 
In Favor Of Mr. Owens .................................................................... 9 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983) ............................................................ 5 
People v. Malcolm, 379 N.E.2d 156 (N.Y. 1978) ................................................... 9 
Porter v. Board of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11 ........... 7 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) ...................................................... 10 
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641 (Ct. App. 2001) ..................................................... 9 
State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664 (2010) ................................................................... 5 
State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654 (1999) ............................................................... 7 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169 (Ct. App. 2006) ................................................... .4 
State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990) ............................................................... 10 
State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387 (Ct. App. 2000) .................................................. 7 
State v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 785, 792 (Ct. App. 1991) ..................................... 6 
State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 ( 1981) .......................................................... passim 
State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App. 1993) ....................................................... 5 
State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362 ( 1996) ................................................................ 10 
State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577 (Ct. App. 2012) ............................................ 10 
State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680 (2004) ................................................................... 7 
United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398 (9th Cir ................................................... 10 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889 (2011) .. passim 
Statues 
I.C. § 18-309 ............................................................................................... passim 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dameniel Owens appeals following the district court's denial of his motion for 
credit for time served. Mr. Owens asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion requesting credit for time served on all of his sentences. Mr. Owens asks that 
this Court overrule State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (1981), which held that a person who 
had served prejudgment incarceration on two charges, and who had received 
consecutive sentences on those charges, could only receive credit for time served on 
those two charges against one of the sentences. Mr. Owens asks this Court to 
reexamine its decision in Hoch in light of the principles of statutory analysis set forth in 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-896 (2011), as 
the Hoch Court unnecessarily went beyond the plain words of the statute and attempted 
to construe legislative intent. Mr. Owens asks this Court to overrule Hoch and hold that 
all presentencing time spent in jail should be credited against each sentence, regardless 
of whether the sentences were later ordered to be served concurrently or consecutively. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On August 16, 2012, a Twin Falls County arrest warrant was issued for 
Mr. Owens for seven counts of issuing a check with insufficient funds. (R., p.31.) He 
was taken into custody on the warrant on August 24, 2012. (R., p.33.) On August 30, 
2012, bond was posted in Mr. Owens' Twin Falls case. (R., p.2.) On October 1, 2012, 
the surety bond on the Twin Falls case was exonerated and bond in that case was reset 
at $100. (R., p.3.) The information in the Twin Falls case was subsequently amended, 
charging Mr. Owens with four additional insufficient funds charges. (R., pp.103-110.) 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Owens pied guilty to eight counts of issuing a 
check with insufficient funds. (R., pp.111, 124.) On December 17, 2012, the district 
court sentenced Mr. Owens to 15 months unified, with six months fixed, on each of the 
eight counts. (R., pp.167-175.) The eight counts were ordered to be served 
consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. (R., 
p.173.)1 The district court entered a written judgment of conviction on December 17 or 
18, 2012.2 (R., pp.167-175.) The written judgment provided that, pursuant to I.C. § 18-
308, Mr. Owens' sentence on each count "shall run consecutive to each other." (R., 
p.173.) 
On May 21, 2013, Mr. Owens filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served in which 
he asserted that he should have received credit for all of the time served on each one of 
the eight counts for which he was convicted. (R., pp.203-205.) Mr. Owens 
acknowledged the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 
(1981 ), but nonetheless asked the district court to credit him on each of the eight 
counts, for the time he spent in custody in prejudgment incarceration on all of the 
charged offenses. (R., pp.203-205.) 
On May 22, 2013, the district court denied Mr. Owens' motion without a hearing. 
(R., pp.207-208.) On June 25, 2013, Mr. Owens filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the 
district court's order denying his motion. (R., pp.211-214.) 
1 The sentences were ordered consecutive to each other, but concurrent with Ada 
County case number 2012-4404, a case in which Mr. Owens pied guilty to one count of 
grand theft and was sentenced to fourteen years, with three years fixed. The sentence 
in that case has been appealed in Idaho Supreme Court case number 40910. 
2 An "Amended" judgment of conviction was filed on December 17, 2012, which did not 
appear to substantively alter the original Judgment of Conviction other than to reduce 
the amount of court costs ordered. (R., pp.176-183.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Owens' motion for credit for time served? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Owens' Motion For Credit For Time Served 
A Introduction 
Mr. Owens asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for 
credit for time served. First, although Mr. Owens' sentences on each count were 
ordered to run consecutively, Mr. Owens nonetheless was in custody on numerous 
counts and I.C. §18-309 is mandatory, specifying that a person shall receive credit. 
Second, notwithstanding the Court's opinion in State v. Hoch, denying a defendant 
credit for time he spent incarcerated on a charge is fundamentally unjust and unfair. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court 
overrule Hoch in light of the principles of statutory analysis set forth in Verska, and order 
that Mr. Owens be given credit for time served on each of the eight counts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A determination as to "[w]hether the district court properly applied the law 
governing credit for time served is a question of law over which" appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal, 
the appellate court will "defer to the district court's findings of fact, however, unless 
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record 
and are therefore clearly erroneous." Id. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Owens' Request For Credit For 
Time Served 
Idaho Code Section 18-309 governs when credit must be given for both pre- and 
post-judgment incarceration: 
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In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period 
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the 
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The 
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence 
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is 
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned 
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as 
part of such term. 
(Emphasis added.) The language of I.C. § 18-309 entitles a defendant to credit for "any 
period of incarceration" and, notably, does not base credit on any factor other than 
actual incarceration "for the offense or an included offense." The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has explained, "[t]he directive of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory, specifying that a 
person shall receive credit." State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983)) (emphasis in original). 
Further, the statute can be broken down into two temporal sections: (1) what 
credit a person shall receive for time spent incarcerated prior to the entry of judgment, 
i.e., pre-judgment incarceration; and (2) how a person is credited with the remainder of 
the term, which commences "upon the pronouncement of sentence," i.e., post-judgment 
incarceration. This temporal break suggests that the credit is a separate issue for the 
sentence later imposed. Additionally, to be able to deny credit for time served based on 
the sentence imposed represents a retrospective adjustment of credit for time already 
served.3 
In State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a 
person who had served prejudgment incarceration on two charges, and who had 
received consecutive sentences on those charges, could only receive credit for time 
3 This is significant in light of this Court's holding in State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664 
(2010) (holding that if the trial court does not specify whether a sentence is to be served 
concurrently with or consecutive to another sentence, the sentence will be concurrent). 
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served on one of the sentences. Id. at 352. This was so because the Court found "no 
intent of the legislature that a person so convicted should have that credit pyramided 
simply because he was sentenced to consecutive terms for separate crimes." Id; see 
also State v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 785, 792 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that credit must 
be allowed on only one of multiple consecutive sentences because conferring credit on 
each of the consecutive sentences would give the defendant credit for more time than 
he actually spent in confinement). 
The totality of the Idaho Supreme Court's findings in Hoch were as follows: 
A statute is to be construed in consideration of the reason for the statute, 
its object and purpose and thereby ascertain and render effective the 
legislative intent. We hold that the purpose of I.C. § 18-309 is clearly to 
give a person convicted of a crime credit for such time as he may have 
served prior to the actual sentencing upon conviction. We find no intent of 
the legislature that a person so convicted should have that credit 
pyramided simply because he was sentenced to consecutive terms for 
separate crimes. 
State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352 (1981) (internal citations omitted). 
Mr. Owens recognizes that State v. Hoch, and its progeny are controlling 
precedent in this case, and under Hoch, Mr. Owens would not be entitled to pre-
judgment credit on all of the counts for which he was in custody. Nonetheless, 
Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court overrule Hoch in light of the principles of 
statutory analysis set forth in Verska. The Court's decision in Hoch is in conflict with 
previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court because the Court failed to correctly 
analyze the statute at issue and it also failed to apply the rule of lenity. 
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1. I.C. § 18-309 Is Not Ambiguous 
Because the language of I.C. § 18-309 is plain and unambiguous, the Appellate 
Court is required to give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. 
A question of statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the Idaho 
Supreme Court exercises free review. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689 (2004). 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the Appellate Court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 
2000). "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one 
reasonable construction." Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 
889, 896 (2011) (quoting Porter v. Board of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 
Idaho 11, 14 (2004)). An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable 
interpretation; an alternative interpretation that is unreasonable would not make the 
statute ambiguous. Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. The language of the statute is to be 
given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Bumight, 132 Idaho at 659. If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, the Appellate Court does not need to look to 
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389. 
Specifically at issue here is whether I.C. § 18-309 limits the type of sentence for 
which a defendant may receive credit. 
2. Hoch Was Incorrectly Decided As The Statute Is Not Ambiguous 
As Justice Bistline correctly observed, Idaho Code Section 18-309 is not 
ambiguous and mandates that the defendant "shall" receive credit. Hoch, 102 Idaho at 
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355. Justice Bistline noted that the Court may only go beyond the plain language of a 
statute when the result is unreasonable or absurd.4 Id. 102 Idaho at 355. 
Idaho Code Section 18-309 provides, "[i]n computing the term of imprisonment, 
the person against whom the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment 
for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for 
the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered." The statute 
provides for credit for a sentence, and does not limit that credit in any way or allow a 
court not to credit a defendant in instances where the sentences are to be served 
consecutively. Yet, the majority opinion in Hoch held: 
[T]he purpose of I.C. § 18-309 is clearly to give a person convicted of a 
crime credit for such time as he may have served prior to the actual 
sentencing upon conviction. We find no intent of the legislature that a 
person so convicted should have that credit pyramided simply because he 
was sentenced to consecutive terms for separate crimes. 
State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352 (1981 ). However, As Justice Bistline stated in his 
well-reasoned dissent: 
The very purpose of I.C. § 18-309 and similar statutes throughout the 
states is totally frustrated by the Court's unreasoning and illogical holding 
today that pretrial incarceration time will only be applied to one of the two 
or more charges upon which a defendant is held to answer and eventually 
sentenced. 
Id. at 354. 
Mr. Owens asserts that the Court's decision in Hoch should be abrogated as the 
reasoning set forth by the Court applies only in instances where the statute was 
determined to be ambiguous. As Justice Bistline noted in his well-reasoned dissenting 
opinion in Hoch, a defendant who has been sentenced on multiple counts receives a 
4 Such is no longer the standard, as in 2011, this Court abrogated Idaho case law which 
held that the Court could modify an unambiguous statute should it be palpably absurd or 
produce absurd results when construed as written. Verska, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96. 
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separate sentence for each count. As such, the statute should be applied to each 
charge, as that is its "plainly worded intent." Hoch, 102 Idaho at 354. Justice Bistline 
compared I.C. § 18-309 to a similarly worded New York statute, and noted that the 
highest court in New York held that "[w]hen a prisoner is held under several charges, jail 
time must be credited against all of them until there is a commencement of 
imprisonment upon sentencing ... " Id. at 354 (quoting People v. Malcolm, 379 N.E.2d 
156 (N.Y. 1978)). As such, the Hoch Court erred in holding that a person convicted of 
separate crimes and sentenced to consecutive terms shall not receive credit to both 
sentences for all pre-judgment incarceration. 
3. Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute, 
Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of 
Mr. Owens 
In this case the statute is not ambiguous-there is only one reasonable 
interpretation of the statute which is, based on the plain meaning of the language of the 
statute, that consecutive time is not excepted from the statute's directive that the person 
"shall receive credit for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment." Thus the 
appellate court has no need to construe the statute by ascertaining the legislative intent. 
This Court must simply follow the law as written. 
In Verska, the Court held that "[i]f the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does 
not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal 
citation omitted). When the Appellate Court must engage in statutory construction 
because an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give 
effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (Ct. App. 2001 ). To ascertain 
such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the 
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context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. 
State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2012) 
Idaho Code Section 18-309 is not ambiguous; however, should this Court 
determine that more than one reasonable interpretation exists, the principle of lenity 
applies, and the statute must be read such that the Court will conclude that Mr. Owens 
is owed credit for the time spent in pre-judgment incarceration on all eight counts. 
The United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an 
ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this 'time-honored 
interpretive guideline' serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
Id. at 1001-1002. "[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971)). Although United States 
Supreme Court precedent is not binding in Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court has held 
that "criminal statutes are to be construed strictly and in favor of the defendant." 
State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365 (1996). Accordingly, Mr. Owens asserts that if it is 
not clear whether or not the legislature intended to credit a defendant for all time spent 
in custody prior to his entry of judgment, regardless of the consecutive or concurrent 
nature of his sentences, this Court should read this statute in favor of Mr. Owens. 
Mr. Owens asserts that, because the facts in the record show that he is entitled 
to additional credit for time served on each count for which he received a sentence, the 
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district court erred when it denied his request for credit for time served. This Court 
should hold that Mr. Owens is entitled to credit for all of the time spent in custody in 
each case. 
Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court overrule the decision in Hoch and 
find that Mr. Owens is entitled to additional credit for every sentence on which he was in 
custody prior to his sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court 
order that he be given credit against each sentence for all presentencing time spent in 
jail. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2013. 
ublic Defender 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of January, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
DAMANIEL OWENS 
INMATE# 61435 
NAMPA COMMUNITY WORK CENTER 
1640 11TH AVENUE NORTH 
NAMPA ID 83687 
RANDY J STOKER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PO BOX 126 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
TREVOR MISSELDINE 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
231 4TH AVE N 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0126 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
SJC/ns 
12 
